Why this rating: Governor+Timelock with an elected Security Council veto (post-BonkDAO flash-loan defense) — procedurally strong, economically decorative; no revenue right for ENS token holders. Security Council (5-of-8) veto blocks Sybil attack output but is not itself GSA-7 Sybil-resistant voting; root keyholders (4-of-7 individuals) control .eth root — DAO control != control of crown jewels
Security Council (5-of-8) veto blocks Sybil attack output but is not itself GSA-7 Sybil-resistant voting
root keyholders (4-of-7 individuals) control .eth root — DAO control != control of crown jewels
GSA-1 downgraded at 2026-08-31 recheck: 'Next Era of ENS DAO' executed on-chain 2026-08-11 — Endowment Safe (~$65M) signer swapped to Foundation-controlled OZ TimelockController (9-day delay); DAO holds no role on EndowmentTimelock (not owner/proposer/admin); $500K standup cap and budget bounds are prose/Cayman-law only, not code
History from the Institute scanner and the 2026-08-31 recheck pulls (Snapshot Hub GraphQL / OpenSquare). Outcomes marked from recheck determinations where the proposal is named; otherwise the recorded state is shown.
Metrics
Treasury
$50.2M (gross; on-chain RPC read)
Treasury (liquid)
$10.0M
Revenue (annual)
$12.0M
Token incentives (annual)
$2.0M
Net earnings (annual)
$10.0M
Distribution enforcement
none
Distribution mechanism
none_to_token
Revenue path
Registration fees -> ENS DAO treasury (DAO decides spending)
Recourse
NONE — no mechanism; holders have no recourse.
Model and audit state reads as of 2026-08-31 (Institute governance model / distribution audit state files). Not a Token Terminal license; curated figures update quarterly.
GSA1 pass → near-miss: Foundation took administrative control of the ~$65M Endowment on 2026-08-11 ('Next Era of ENS DAO' executed on-chain) — Endowment Safe signer swapped to Foundation 3-of-5 Safe + OZ TimelockController; tokenholders cannot propose Endowment transactions and the DAO has no timelock role
GSA2 near-miss strengthened: director-removal petition process added in Foundation bylaws — legal-process, not on-chain enforceable
GSA3/GSA4 confirmed fail: registration-fee revenue still not distributed to token; $500K cap and budget bounds are prose/Cayman-law only ('none of it onchain' per delegate review)