Why this rating: On-chain pDAO governance (RPL-staked node operators vote on RPIPs, 100 RPL proposal bond) with treasury control — but the oDAO (oracle DAO, ~8 members, self-selecting, NOT token-voted) holds veto power over pDAO changes per RPIP-24. No economic rights: fees accrue to node operators, not RPL; Saturn 2 UARS (RPL burn or buy&LP) pending. GSA-1 near-miss: pDAO controls treasury via on-chain vote, but oDAO veto gate (RPIP-24: malicious/not-voted/manipulated/damaging) is a second house; GSA-2 near-miss: oDAO is a SEPARATE self-selecting DAO ('pDAO has no authority over the oDAO'); oDAO members not removable by RPL holders
GSA-1 near-miss: pDAO controls treasury via on-chain vote, but oDAO veto gate (RPIP-24: malicious/not-voted/manipulated/damaging) is a second house
GSA-2 near-miss: oDAO is a SEPARATE self-selecting DAO ('pDAO has no authority over the oDAO'); oDAO members not removable by RPL holders
GSA-3 fail: protocol fees flow to node operators, not RPL; Saturn 2 UARS (Unified Adjustable Revenue Split) vote pending could add RPL burn/buy&LP — would upgrade if passed
Saturn 1 launched Feb 18 2026 (UARS framework); oDAO ~8 members, 51% quorum
No proposal history is available for Rocket Pool in the current scanner window.
Metrics
Curated metric — next quarterly update. On-chain revenue, treasury, and distribution-enforcement reads are not yet wired for this DAO's space in the Institute's state files; the quarterly re-assessment cycle will populate this block.